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THE LAWYER WHO OVERIDENTIFIES WITH
HIS CLIENT
John T. Noonan, Jr.*
The classic case cited by John WAigmore for recognition of the
lawyer-client privilege is Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea (Exchequer,
1743).' The privilege, in fact, goes back far earlier. It was, for exam-
ple, invoked by counsel for a bribegiver in the investigation for brib-
ery in 1620 of Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England.2 But the
reasons for the privilege never seem to have been more fully explored
by lawyers than in Annesley. One reason urged by counsel is this: "In
pleading, it is 'ponit in loco suo attornatum,' the attorney is as him-
self. And it is contrary to the rules of natural justice and equity, that
any man should betray himself."3 The attorney-client privilege is, in
other words, a logical extension of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. As a person should not be forced to act so unnaturally as to
testify against himself, so a person's attorney-who is as himself-
should not be forced. The key to the argument is the identification of
client with lawyer.
I do not believe that this fiction, attractive though it is, especially
in regard to the criminal defense lawyer, is the real reason for the
privilege, at least in the full-blooded form in which it exists today.
The real reason is the desirability of lawyers educating clients in the
law-that is, educating them so that they come to realize the purposes
and limits, the malleability, and the strength of the legal system as it
applies to their affairs; for lawyers can enter on this work of intimate
* Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1 17 How. St. Tr. 1139 (Ex. 1743). ForJohn Wigmore's citations of Annesey, see
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TFrisE ON THE ANGLO-A.MwE RIN Srsmi OF EIDENCE IN
TUAuS AT CoMMON LAW §§ 166, 272, 278, 280, 1013, 1099, 1130, 1154, 1361, 1362,
1364, 1431, 1487, 1605, 2213, 2290, 2291, 2294, 2298, 2310 (3d ed. 1940).
2 SeeJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BIUBEs 348 (1984).
3 Annesly, 17 How. St. Tr. at 1225.
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education only if their clients can disclose their affairs candidly and
fully to their counsel. 4 The lawyer-client privilege rests on this secure
foundation, not on a metaphor that takes the lawyer for the client and
turns them into a unity.
If lawyer and client are not the same, what kind of relationship
have they? An experienced Boston lawyer and provocative writer,
Charles Curtis, once indicated that they might be like lovers or even
spouses. 5 Describing the duty a lawyer has to the client to protect his
confidence and the duty the lawyer has to the court not to deceive it,
Curtis added, "If I ask you which of two girls you love the most, you
are in effect declining to answer when you say 'Both.'"6 Curtis sug-
gested that similarly a lawyer is plighted to both court and client, and
he concluded that this dual loyalty is "somewhat bigamous. '7
This metaphor does not illuminate the relation of duties to client
and duties to court, and it misleads as to the relation of lawyer to
client. The lawyer has a specific duty to preserve the confidence of
the client, but that duty is subordinate to an equally specific duty not
to participate in fraud upon the court. A hierarchy of duties-not a
conflict-exists. The lawyer does not have two husbands or two wives.
The metaphor of sexual love or marriage is inappropriate in sug-
gesting a unique personal bond that does not exist in the lawyer's
relation either to the court or to the client. In the biblical tradition
that has informed our culture, husband and wife are one flesh.8 Law-
yer and client are not one flesh. The lawyer is not a bigamist.
Another authority, Charles Fried, has described the lawyer as a
friend, a special purpose friend, and has elucidated the lawyer-client
relation in terms of this universal category.9 Friendship is a form of
love. In Thomas Aquinas's fundamental account of love, the beloved
is one who meets a need-we desire the beloved because he or she
does meet the need. But the beloved is also one whom we love be-
cause he or she is like us. In every love these two dynamisms are at
work-the desire to have the need met, the desire to bestow good
upon one's alter ego; the one impulse, if you like, selfish, the other
4 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUJr R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2001).
5 See CHARLEs P. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR LAW 10-25 (1954).
6 Id. at 20.
7 Id
8 See Genesis 2:24.
9 See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend. The Moral Foundations of the Latner-dient
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1065-76 (1976).
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altruistic, and the selfish or the altruistic preponderating in arying
degrees depending on the nature of the love.10
It has been unkindly observed in response to Fried that lawyers
are paid and a special purpose friend who is paid is a prostitute."
This sharp retort fails to allow for the element of identification that is
present in friendship. A relationship that is purely exploitative, a rela-
tionship that uses another person only as a means to meet a need, is
not love and so is not friendship. The lawyer, as Fried rightly sees, is
not mere means. The client is, to a degree, identifying with this better
self. Conversely, since friendship is mutual, the lawyer is finding in
the client a satisfaction of needs-not only the need for a fee, but the
need to have the lawyer's skills appreciated, the need to play a part in
the world, the need to make a difference. The lawyer is also, to be
effective, identifying with the client, with the client's troubles or
problems, with the client's expectations and goals. The lawyer wNants
to confer a good upon the client. Rejecting the metaphor of Annesliy
and rejecting the strong version of friendship in its conjugal or sexual
form, I cannot reject the view that the identification which occurs in
the love that informs friendships must be present if the lawyer is to do
the lawyer's work well.
To illustrate my point, I shall take one incident in the life of a
famous and successful lawyer, who was an even more famous and suc-
cessfuljudge. The incident must be held in perspective. It was culled
by this lawyer's enemies from a career of over thirty years at the Bos-
ton bar as the most damaging episode they could urge against his ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is far from
encapsulating the whole legal practice of Louis Brandeis. But we are
all human, and it is an episode in which a strength of Brandeis that
could be a weakness manifested itself.
The panic of 1907 was in full swing. The morning of September
3, 1907, Abe Stein, seller of goatskins and sheepskins to tanneries, re-
ceived a telephone call in New York thatJim Lennox was in trouble. -12
Lennox, a tannery owner, owed Stein about $200,000.13 Stein took
the afternoon train from New York to Boston, bringing with him his
10 See THOMAS AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOCICA PL II-II, q. 26, arts. 4-8 (Fathers of
the Eng. Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros., Inc. 1947).
11 See William H. Simon, The Ideolog, of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 108.
12 The Subcommittee of the Committee of theJuditary of the United States Senate, On the
Nomination of Louis B. Brandeis to be an AssociateJustice of the Suprne Court of the United
States, 64th Cong. 1104 (1916) (testimony of Abe Stein).
13 Id. at 1105.
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lawyer, Moses Stroock. 14 On the train they encountered a friend of
Stroock's, Henry Siegel, who told them that if they wanted counsel for
an important case in Boston, Louis Brandeis was their man. 15
The next morning Stein and Stroock saw Lennox, who told them
that he had enough assets to pull through but needed $700,000 to
straighten out his affairs.' 6 Stein suggested Lennox's creditors might
help work out a solution.' 7 Stroock told Lennox that he needed
counsel and suggested Brandeis.' 8 The group then adjourned to
Brandeis's office, where a telephone call by Stroock to Brandeis had
arranged for their reception. 19 Lennox was accompanied by two busi-
ness friends, William Spaulding and a Mr. Coburn.20 Stroock at once
retained Brandeis to act for Stein. 21 Who would represent Lennox
was left open. It was assumed that Stein and Lennox had the common
objective of seeing Lennox through his crisis of solvency. Brandeis
disclosed that his partner, George Nutter, did work for another New
York creditor of Lennox-Weil, Farrell & Co., notebrokers-but Nut-
ter saw no objection to Brandeis going ahead with the parties in the
office.22
Brandeis now interrogated Jim Lennox closely about his finances.
A stenographer was brought in to record the questions and answers
and, as a result of the controversy over Brandeis's nomination to the
Court, this stenographic record is now public.23 Spaulding, Coburn,
Stein, and Stroock were still present, so Lennox cannot have believed
that he was talking only to his lawyer; yet, he showed a candor that
only the .sense that he was talking to people on his side could have
induced.
Brandeis's questions established that Jim Lennox and his father
Patrick, as partners, ran two tanneries at Peabody and Salem, Massa-
chusetts; that their gross sales were about $1 million;24 that the busi-
ness had been losing money in recent years;25 that the assets of the
14 Id. at 1104-05.
15 Id. at 1105.
16 Id. at 1106.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 311 (testimony of MosesJ. Stroock); accord id. at 1105-06 (testimony of
Abe Stein).
19 Id. at 1105-06 (testimony of Abe Stein).
20 See id. at 311 (testimony of Moses J. Stroock).
21 See id. at 312.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 775-91 (testimony of Edward F. McClennan).
24 Id. at 776.
25 See id. at 783.
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business were about $800,000 and the liabilities $1.2 million;2 G that
the two Lennoxes had other property that, if sold at its highest value,
could meet the liabilities;27 and-a key disclosure-that Lennox in
getting credit had not always been honest in his financial statements.28
Brandeis advised Jim Lennox to talk to his father and see if he had any
preference as to counsel.2 9
The following day, September 5, Jim Lennox met ith Stroock
and Brandeis. Brandeis said, "Well, now Mr. Stroock, I should think
that the question we ought to decide now is as to whether I should act
for Mr. Lennox in this matter or not."3 0 Lennox said he ianted to
pay one hundred cents on the dollar.31 Brandeis noted Lennox's vul-
nerability because of his inaccurate financial statements.32 Brandeis
lectured him on the seriousness of statements to lenders and pre-
dicted he could have a good deal of trouble. Brandeis said:
[I]f we all agree that what we want to do is to distribute this prop-
erty according to the legal rights of creditors, I could be more use-
ful to that end by acting for Mr. Lennox instead of for Mr.
Stein .... I should feel if I were acting for Mr. Lennox as trustee,
that it was the duty of the trustee to see that everybody got his legal
rights as nearly as we could make it .... a3
Brandeis then proposed that the Lennoxes make an assignment
for the benefit of creditors. Stroock said, "Mr. Brandeis' [s] suggestion
is the best."34 Lennox asked, 'You are speaking now of Mr. Brandeis
acting as my counsel?"3 5 Brandeis intervened, "Not altogether as )our
counsel but as a trustee of your property."3 6 Lennox responded, "I
came to you, and I shall certainly do whatever you say; that is why I
came to you."
3 7
On the basis of this conversation, both Lennox and Stroock in-
ferred that Brandeis had assumed the position of Lennox's counselYas
Brandeis's office filled in the blanks in a printed assignment for the
26 I&. at 784.
27 See id. at 786.
28 See id at 783.
29 See i& at 786.
30 Id. at 788.
31 See id. at 787.
32 See id.
33 Id. at 789.




38 See id. at 1119 (testimony ofJames T. Lennox) (stating that Brandeis was em-
ployed "absolutely" as Lennox's attorney); id. at 1087 (testimony of MosesJ. Stroock)
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benefit of creditors.39 Both Lennoxes signed it, transferring all of
their property to the assignee, who was Brandeis's partner, George
Nutter.40 Nothing in the stenographic report of the conference indi-
cates that Brandeis told Lennox that an assignment for the benefit of
creditors was an act of bankruptcy.
41
Five days later, after Nutter had found the Lennoxes' books in
unsatisfactory condition, Nutter recorded the assignment. 2 Shortly
thereafter, the Brandeis firm, acting for the notebrokers, Weil, Farrell
& Co., instituted involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against the Len-
noxes, alleging the assignment as the act of bankruptcy.
4'
Jim Lennox thereupon retained as counsel an eminent trial law-
yer, Sherman Whipple, who called on Brandeis, who told him, "I did
not intend to act personally for Mr. Lennox, nor did I agree to.'
44
Whipple replied: "Yes, ... but you advised him to make the assign-
ment. For whom were you counsel when you advised him to do that,
if not for the Lennoxes? '45 Brandeis said, "I should say I was counsel
for the situation."
46
Whipple could not refrain from retorting:
I must say, Mr. Brandeis, it looks to me very much, according to
your principles, as if when a man was bankrupt and went to a lawyer,
and the lawyer advises him to make an assignment for the benefit of
his creditors, he assigns his lawyer with it, very much in the way a
covenant runs with the land.
47
Brandeis replied:
Mr. Whipple, I think that is a very unkind and very ungenerous
statement for you to make. It impugns my motives, and I can only
assure you that I had no such motive in doing it. I was merely occu-
pying myself in seeing that this property, which was brought into my
office in this way, was equitably and fairly distributed among the
creditors, and I was looking after the interests of everyone.
48
(stating his understanding that "at that time Mr. Brandeis was representing Mr.
Lennox").
39 See id. at 1087-89 (testimony of MosesJ. Stroock).
40 See i&. at 796-800 ("Interview-Re Lennox Matter"-Sept. 5, 1907) (discussing
the assignment from Patrick Lennox and James Lennox to George R. Nutter).
41 See id. at 791-96. Lennox denied that Brandeis informed him. See id. at 1115
(testimony of James T. Lennox).
42 See id. at 804 (testimony of Edward F. McClennan).





48 Id. at 287-88.
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On reflection Whipple agreed that Brandeis's motives had not
been mercenary. Brandeis, he thought, had acted as he had because
he
was so much absorbed in the question of caring for the situation,
and so much interested in the development of his ideas as to how
this estate should be administered, that he unconsciously over-
looked the more human aspect of it, which would perhaps have ap-
peared to another;, that here was a man confronted with perplexities
and charges and troubles, who wanted his personal and individual
care and attention. But I think Mr. Brandeis looked upon it as a
problem of distribution.49
In defense of Brandeis it might be argued that we are witnessing a
kind of foreshadowing: Brandeis acted as a judge before he was a
judge. The impulse to consider every interest, the impulse to take
charge are both judicial instincts. But even ajudge cannot be blind to
the human aspects of the case he is addressing. Lennox was a care-
less, slovenly, deceitful businessman. Brandeis was a careful and thor-
ough lawyer. But when Brandeis told Stroock and Lennox that they
would now decide whether he would be counsel for Lennox, when
Brandeis then told Lennox that he was acting "not altogether as your
counsel,"50 and when Brandeis advised Lennox to make the fatal as-
signment, Brandeis was not doing very well as a lawyer.
Why is this incident-this misunderstanding, if one likes-of over
eighty years ago still of interest to us? Because it illustrates in the case
of a lawyer of extraordinary ability how a lawyer must empathize with
the person who comes to his office to get the lawyer's advice, who says,
"I shall certainly do whatever you say-that is why I came to you." No
lawyer is counsel to a situation. Underidentification with a client is as
bad as overidentification.
Underidentification is here, no doubt, carried to the point of car-
icature. The lawyer does not remember that he took the client as a
client. The lawyer does not give the client the most elementary advice
about the consequences of the act the lawyer is advising him to per-
form. The lawyer represents another client and, acting for that client,
puts his unremembered client into bankruptcy. At the heart of the
situation is the lawyer's desire to abstract himself from the needs and
pressures of a particular individual in order to go on and straighten
out a mess. In some other world, law could be practiced in that fash-
ion. It is not the way law has been generally practiced in ours.
49 Id at 299.
50 See id. at 288-89.
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I turn from underidentification to overidentification. My case
again comes from the area of bankruptcy-an area where, perhaps
because of the feeble condition of the bankrupt, lawyers loom particu-
larly large. The lawyer involved is not as famous as Brandeis, but
nonetheless is very famous because of the firm of which he was a
member and which since 1943 has borne his name, Cravath, Swaine &
Moore.51 Hoyt Augustus Moore was born in Ellsworth, Maine in
1870.52 He graduated from Bowdoin, Phi Beta Kappa, in 1895 and
then taught school, becoming principal of the Ellsworth High School
and then principal of the Putnam, Connecticut High School.5 3 Late
bloomers in the law, while rare, are not unknown. 5 4 At thirty-one,
Moore entered Harvard Law School.55 He was on the law review and,
on receiving his degree in 1904, entered Paul Cravath's office in New
York.5 6 Two years later, he married the daughter of a banker from his
home town.57
Moore's reputation for "hard, driving work" was legendary. 8
When a partner objected that the office was under such pressure as to
need more associates, Moore is said to have replied: "That's silly. No
one is under pressure. There wasn't a light on when I left at two
o'clock this morning."59 William 0. Douglas, who was a Cravath asso-
ciate in the late 1920s, recalls being with Moore when Moore got a
telephone call from his wife that his house was on fire.60 Moore's re-
ply was, "Why in hell bother me? Call the fire department."' This
single-minded devotion to his work was manifested in Moore's meticu-
lousness in drafting documents. An associate who copied a recent
document approved by him was denounced for his shoddy work, and
when he said that he had merely followed Moore, Moore replied, "Ha-
51 See 2 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRS AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1819-1948,
at 718 (1948).
52 See 2 id. at 141.
53 See 2 id. at 142-43.
54 E.g., Raoul Berger, associate concertmaster of the Cincinnati Symphony
Orchestra, who was later a law teacher. See Deaths Elsewhere, DAYrON DAILY NEws, Sept.
3, 2000, at 7B.
55 See 2 SWAINE, supra note 51, at 143.
56 See 2 id.
57 See 2 id.
58 See 2 id.
59 2 id.
60 WiLUmi 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLVYFARs; THE Arromo,.
RAPHY OF WILLIAM, 0. DOUGLAS 151 (1974).
61 See id.
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ven't you been here long enough to know that what was good yester-
day isn't good enough today?" 62
Moore's big client was the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, the sec-
ond largest steel company in the country.63 He had other clients and,
at any one time, would be handling one hundred or more cases for
them and Bethlehem, but Bethlehem came first.64 His partner, Rob-
ert Swaine, wrote of him, "No lawyer ever unreservedly gave more of
himself to a client than Hoyt Moore has given to Bethlehem."6-  It is
in the case I am about to describe that Moore made the most unre-
served effort.
Bethlehem had had, for some time, its eye on the rflliamsport
Wire Rope Company, the manufacturer of ten percent of the wire
rope in the nation.66 Bethlehem was its major supplier of steel.67 WVil-
liamsport was a town of about 40,000 in Lycoming County, Penn-
sylvania, to the north of Harrisburg and to the east of Scranton, within
that bleak hardscrabble area that John O'Hara has often invoked.
The wire company's common and preferred stock was locally owvned. c' s
In biblical terms, the company was the community's ewe lamb and
Bethlehem was the covetous rich man. In 1926, the wire company
had been in business about forty years. 9 In that year, Bethlehem
helped it expand by arranging a bond issue for it and, showing more
than a healthy interest, lent its president, Robert Gilmore, $133,000.
70
In 1932, as a consequence of the Great Depression, Williamsport Wire
Rope Company entered into a receivership. 71 The receivership was
administered by the federal district judge in Scranton.
72
The federal districtjudge in Scranton, AlbertJohnson, had been
appointed by President Coolidge and was a veteran of the bench.
73
He was a peculiar judge, indeed the kind of judge who, because of
gross defects, is no judge at all but a kind of imposter set up to wear
the robe and mouth the words of ajudge while behaving like an ordi-
nary highwayman. Judge Johnson exploited everyone he could safely
exploit. He forced his secretary and the deputy clerk of court to rent
62 2 SwAnm, supra note 51, at 144.
63 2 id. at 574 n.1.
64 See generay 2 id. (describing Moore's extensive work for Bethlehem).
65 2id.
66 See H.R. REP. No. 79-1639, at 26 (1946).
67 See id. at 27.
68 See id. at 26.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id. at 26-27.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 1.
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from him, at higher than usual rents.74 He directed these federal em-
ployees to work as servants in his home, cleaning the house, washing
the floors, and cleaning his car.75 He set up an association called the
Tea Springs Lodge, where he and his family hunted and fished, which
was financed by the $500 initiation fees of lawyers who did not hunt or
fish but who did practice before his court and who wanted patronage
appointments from him.76 He saw bankruptcies, reorganizations, and
receiverships as opportunities to collect payoffs from the trustees or
receivers he appointed and from the parties interested in his approval
of their plans.77 Judge Johnson was finally investigated by a Depart-
ment ofJustice lawyer, Max Goldschein, and the House of Representa-
tives and, to avoid impeachment, resigned his office and his
pension.78 But that was 1945. In 1932, Judge Johnson presided over
the receivership of the Williamsport Wire Rope Company, whose larg-
est creditor, in the amount of $700,000, was Bethlehem.
79
Here, then, are the ingredients for what happened: a potentially
valuable but presently helpless small company in receivership; a big
company that wanted it and had legitimate claims to be paid by it; a
corruptjudge; and a very experienced lawyer, thorough, efficient, and
meticulous, whose major client's interests he was charged with
protecting.
The receivership began with Judge Johnson appointing the re-
ceivers-Gilmore, the former president, and Ballard, the former sales
manager.80 Johnson then proposed a third receiver, Carl Schug, his
son-in-law; but he instructed counsel to have that appointment made
by J. Warren Davis, a Third Circuit judge, who sat in New Jersey.8'
Davis, as other evidence shows, was a corrupt judge, too, and John-
son's confederate.8 2 Hoyt Moore began his collaboration with Judge
Johnson by looking into the question whether a Third Circuit judge,
74 See id. at 43-44.
75 See id. at 44.
76 See id. at 40.
77 See id. at 40-41.
78 See H.R. REP. No. 79-1640 (1946) ("Accepting the Renunciation by Albert W.
Johnson of Pension under Section 260 of the Judicial Code.").
79 See Conduct of Albert .Johnson and Albert L. Watson, United States District Judges,
Middle District of Pennsylvania, Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judicial, 79th
Cong. 789 (1945) [hereinafter Johnson Hearings] (testimony of Harry NV. Mumford).
80 See id. at 27.
81 See id. at 218-19 (testimony of Hoyt A. Moore) (discussing the appointment of
receivers); JosEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPTJUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO BmnRERY AND OrIIER
HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 169 (1962).
82 See Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514, 517 (3d Cir.
1948).
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sitting in New Jersey, had the power to appoint a receiver in a case in
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Satisfied that this power existed,
Moore made no objection to the propriety of its exerciseY83 It was the
kind of collaboration that was tactical, required no bad action on
Moore's part, and yet made him from the start aware of the crafty
cupidity of the judge whom his client faced.
The wire rope company's problem had been a shortage of ready
cash; when it entered the receivership, its total assets exceeded its lia-
bilities by about $5 million.8 4 Four years into the receivership, a sub-
stantial amount of cash had accumulated. Judge Johnson announced
in open court that he was proud of this accomplishment. He was de-
lighted that "this very valuable industry," which had "furnished em-
ployment to so many members of this community" could be "saved to
serve this community."85
Meanwhile, other plans were afoot. In July 1936, Harry W.
Mumford, a Scranton lawyer who was doing the local work for Bethle-
hem at Moore's direction, was contacted by another Scranton lawyer,
John Memolo, counsel for the receivers.8 6 Memolo indicated that he
had a proposition to make to Bethlehem and that he was in touch
with those who thought the receivership was an occasion for "a kill-
ing."87 Mumford checked out what he should do with Hoyt Moore
and then arranged for Memolo to see Robert McMath, the secretary
of Bethlehem and a former associate at the Cravath firm.&I Mumford
and McMath asked each other if Memolo was Judge Johnson's bag-
man. Mumford reported to Moore that $200,000 was "in the air."89
After these initial maneuvers and -,ague hints, Harry Mumford
and John Memolo came to see Hoyt Moore at the Crawath office in
New York.90 Mumford left the room.91 Memolo asked if there was
anything he could do to help Bethlehem.92 Moore was noncommittal,
but after some talk about how the wire company operations were go-
ing, Moore asked him if he had any idea what the costs of administer-
ing the receivership would be.93 Memolo said, all things considered,
83 See Johnson Hearings, supra note 79, at 220 (testimony of Hoyt A. Moore).
84 See H.R REP. No. 79-1639, at 27 (1946).
85 Id. at 30.
86 See id. at 31-33.
87 Johnson Hearings, supra note 79, at 781-83 (testimony of Harry N% Mumford).
88 See id. at 782.
89 Id. at 784.
90 I. at 783.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 784.
93 Id.
2001]
838 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:3
"in the neighborhood of $250,000. ' '9 4 Moore said he himself had esti-
mated between $150,000 and $200,000, but that $250,000 wai "not
excessive." 95 In this way, without ever using an ugly word, the upper
limit of the bribe was fixed. What Bethlehem was to get for its money
was not spelled out.
What Bethlehem did get made the payoff a lucrative investment.
The wire rope company had been in a position to emerge in a solvent
state from the receivership. But Bethlehem, which had bought up the
company's bonds at seventy cents on the dollar, now moved to fore-
close the mortgage securing the bonds. 96 The tame receivers did not
oppose the bill of foreclosure.9 7 The objections of stockholders were
overruled by Judge Johnson. 98 At the foreclosure sale, which took
place in May 1937, Bethlehem bid $3.3 million, which it met by put-
ting up the bonds acquired at seventy; the debt of $700,000 owed by
the Nire rope company to it; and debts owed other creditors, acquired
by Bethlehem at forty-four cents on the dollar.99 Bethlehem had to
put up in hard cash $89,000, plus administrative costs, and it took over
a going enterprise that now had cash on hand of over $1 million. 10
Bethlehem had a bargain that gave the word "Steel" in its name a new
meaning. Years later, when the corruption of Judge Johnson had be-
come public, the wire rope company stockholders were to sue Bethle-
hem and get a settlement of $6 million. 1 1 In 1937, they were wiped
out.
By the terms of the foreclosure decree signed by Judge Johnson,
the buyer had to pay the costs of the administration of the receiver-
ship. 10 2 This neat drafting, done under Moore's supervision, had two
functions: (1) it discouraged other bidders at the sale because they
could not be certain what these costs might be; and (2) it let the judge
approve his own bribe-that is, the costs of administration were
largely to be a payoff distributed to Judge Johnson's henchmen, and
Judge Johnson now ordered the bribegiver, Bethlehem, to pay these
costs. Dexterity in drafting could not go much farther, nor could
effrontery.
94 Id. at 804 (testimony ofJohn Memolo).
95 Id
96 See H.R. REP. No. 79-1639, at 31 (1946).
97 See id.
98 See id. at 32.
99 See id. at 31.
100 See id. at 31-32.
101 See BORIUN, supra note 81, at 181.
102 See H.R. REP. No. 79-1639, at 35 (1946).
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Considerable care was taken as to how the payoff was actually
made. Memolo at one point passed on to Moore the suggestion that
Bethlehem put up some of the money in advance in cash and have it
placed in a safe deposit box with Memolo having one key, Moore the
other.103 It was the kind of indication of good faith on the part of a
briber that Judge Johnson was evidently accustomed to. Moore was
indignant. "Well," he said, "I'll be damned if I would listen to a thing
like that. No one can put a gun to my temple." 1 4 He could not toler-
ate such crudity. He added, "[T]hese country judges [are] always try-
ing to hold someone up .... 1 05 The bribe was to be delivered not
covertly and in cash, but publicly to the bagmen and by check. The
country judge's old-fashioned mechanism was to be replaced by the
city lawyer's drafting.
What was done was that a number of straws of Memolo were given
jobs that seemed plausible in the administration of a receivership;
they were paid by Bethlehem with the court's approval; and they then
turned over the bulk of what they got to Memolo to be passed on to
the judge after Memolo took his cut. To give three examples,
Memolo's brother Martin, the business agent of the union, was given
by the court the title of "Agent and Appointee of the Court to Super-
vise and Oversee Operation of Properties" in the final phase of the
court's supervision of the wire rope company. 10 6 Martin never came
to the plant or did any visible work. Bethlehem gave him a check for
$66,990.107 EJ. Maloney, an accountant friend of Memolo, per-
formed an audit of the books worth in Maloney's own view $900; he
was paid $31,075 by Bethlehem.'08 J.W. Crolly, a lawyer who shared
office space with Memolo, was entitled by the court "Special Master
and Auditor" and got a Bethlehem check for $30,850.01.109 The bills
from Martin Memolo, Maloney, and Crolly were sent by them to
Moore for his approval before payment." 0 Moore then checked with
John Memolo to be sure the amounts were right."' After getting
John Memolo's approval, Moore recorded the approval with the nota-
103 See id. at 32.
104 Johnson Hearings, supra note 79, at 808 (testimony ofJohn Memolo).
105 Id.
106 See id. at 622 (testimony of Robert E. McMath, Financial Vice President and
Secretary of Bethlehem).
107 See id. at 621.
108 See id at 623; id at 776 (testimony of Edu-ardJ. Maloney) (stating that Bethle-
hem paid Maloney $31,075).
109 See id. at 622 (testimony of Robert E. McMath).
110 See id. at 819 (testimony ofJohn Memolo).
111 See id. at 820.
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tion "O.K J.M." 2 In his careful, meticulous way, Moore retained in
his files (to be discovered by the F.B.I.) this evidence of John
Memolo's role in the camouflaging of the distribution of the loot.
As for the morality of the matter, Jake Greenes, a beer salesman
who did odd jobs forJudge Johnson and picked up some of the cash
after the checks were cashed by the bagmen, declared, "I felt there
might probably be a question of ethics involved, but I certainly had no
idea there was anything too terrible about it."113 Harry Mumford,
Bethlehem's local Scranton lawyer, testified, "I had no absolute knowl-
edge of anything wrong."" 4 And again, "Having had some suspicions,
I thought the less I knew about it, the better."115 And finally, "[Olne
argument that appeals to my mind, and appealed at that time, was
that perhaps if a deal were made, it was the only way in which Bethle-
hem could secure their rights."116
No comment on the morality or legality of the operation is re-
corded on the part of Hoyt Moore. Undoubtedly when the receiver-
ship started, Mumford's thought would have occurred to him:
Bethlehem was going to be held up. It had $700,000 at stake. But
after Moore's mind got to work on the problem, certainly after
Memolo had made his overtures, Moore knew that a deal with Judge
Johnson could do much better for Bethlehem than merely securing its
rights; a deal could let Bethlehem steal the wire rope company.
Why did Hoyt Moore engineer such a deal for Bethlehem? I do
not believe his motives were merely mercenary. The Cravath firm was
paid $125,209 for its services in the acquisition of the company (the
figure wasjust half the amount of the bribe). 117 In 1937, $125,209 was
a very substantial amount of money. But it represented only a portion
of the Cravath firm's billings to Bethlehem." 8 Moore could have
foregone his share of the fee without discomfort. The motivation of
this driven man was not money-certainly not money only.
He had, I suggest, identified with the client-an identification
easier, rather than harder, when the client was not a single flesh and
blood individual, but a corporation, which no one individual encapsu-
lated. For many purposes, Moore was Bethlehem. It became his alter
ego.
112 Id. at 576-78 (testimony of Hoyt A. Moore).
113 Id. at 770 (testimony ofJacob Greenes).
114 Id. at 793 (testimony of Harry W. Mumford).
115 Id. at 797.
116 Id. at 800.
117 See id. at 580 (testimony of Hoyt A. Moore).
118 See id- at 602-03 (grand jury testimony of Hoyt A. Moore).
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At the same time that he identified with the client, he wanted to
prove to its officers, the men with whom he dealt, that he was the
master of the situation, that there was nothing his client wanted that
he could not bring off. He, Hoyt Moore, was indispensable to Bethle-
hem. He would demonstrate his indispensability by the exercise of his
most polished skill: his draftmanship would be the means by which
Bethlehem would reap the harvest it desired.
It may be objected that Moore's kind of identification with a cli-
ent is a caricature. Of course if a lawyer bribes a federal judge to
achieve his client's end, he is going too far, he has overidentified. His
case is ruled by the criminal law. The case does not speak to less ex-
treme situations. But the advantage of the caricature is that it under-
lines essential features. Hoyt Moore, a very well-educated, intelligent,
prosperous, secure partner in an established Wall Street firm, was led
to criminal conduct to serve his client. His case permits us to see how
powerful the impulse to identify is, how subversive the instinct to se-
cure the client's goals may be.
I have presented two illustrations, both extreme, but both involv-
ing lawyers of uncommon ability. Could I not give you a third case
where just the right degree of distance was maintained, the right de-
gree of friendly identification achieved? When a lawyer-client relation
does not go wrong, it is hard to find the facts of the relation pub-
lished. The right relation I believe is struck most of the time. It was
by the lawyers with whom I practiced in Boston and is by the lawyers I
see now before the court of appeals. It is a relation that is not that of
judge of the situation nor that of manipulator serving one's other self.
It is that of a friend who is a professional.
A professional, as Plato put it in The Republic, is a person who
serves another principally for the other's good." 9 Plato's illustrations
were a physician, who serves the health of the physician's patient, and
a ship's captain, who sails the ship to port.'20 Plato's examples are
disarmingly simple: it appears obvious that a doctor must seek health,
and a captain must steer for port. A lawyer's task is typically more
complex. He or she must attend to a plurality of goods-the good of
the client, the good of the courts, the good of the lawyer's partners,
and even in degree the good of the other parties. The law as a system
is multi-purposed; the lawyer must be multi-purposed. To serve pro-
fessionally the persons embodying these purposes, a lawyer cannot
serve the situation nor contract his or her identity to the client's.
119 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. I, §§ 341-346, at 16-22 (A.D. Lindsay trans.,
1992).
120 See id. § 341, at 16-17.
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